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Abstract
Many fisheries are potentially very valuable. According to a recent report by the World Bank and the FAO (2008), global fisheries 
rents could be as high as US$ 40-60 billion annually on a sustainable basis. However, according to the report, due to the “common 
property problem”, most fisheries of the world are severely overexploited and generate no economic rents. The Lake Victoria Nile 
perch fishery could be among the most valuable fisheries in the world. Unfortunately, also this fishery has fallen prey to the common 
property problem with excessive fishing effort, dwindling stocks and declining profitability. As a result, there is a large and growing 
rents loss in this fishery (compared to the optimal) reducing economic welfare and economic growth opportunities in the countries 
sharing this fishery.  As in other fisheries, the biological and economic recovery of this fishery can only come though improved 
fisheries management. 
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Introduction
The social purpose of fisheries is to utilize naturally 
occurring fish stocks to improve as much as possible the 
long run living standards  of  the population. To achieve 
this aim usually implies that the fish stock be modestly 
harvested and maintained at a relatively large size while 
causing minimal environmental damage. In other words, 
maximizing the  contribution of  fisheries  to  social  well-
being normally implies sustainable fisheries.
The net economic benefits  from fisheries are often 
referred  to  as  fisheries  rents.  In  developed  market 
economies,  fisheries  rents  may be  approximated  by the 
profits  accruing  from  the  fishing  operations.  In  less 
developed market  economies,  the net  economic benefits 
tend to exceed the profits of fishing as the latter is usually 
measured.
Many fish stocks are potentially very valuable and 
on average  they may be able  to  generate  net  economic 
benefits  (rents) amounting to some 50% of the value of 
landings (FAO, 1992; Garcia and Newton, 1997; World 
Bank,  2008).  To see  this  in  context,  this  profit  ratio  is 
comparable  to  those  obtainable  from  fairly  typical  oil 
reserves.  An  added  bonus  is  that  fish  stocks  are 
renewable,  so  profits  from  fisheries  can  be  sustained 
indefinitely. Oil reserves, by contrast, must eventually run 
out.
The  problem  is  that  because  of  inappropriate 
institutional  structure,  the  so-called  common  property 
arrangement, the potential net benefits from fisheries are 
generally  not  realized.  Under  the  common property  (or 
common pool) arrangement everyone, or at least everyone 
belonging to a well-defined group,  can extract  from the 
fish stocks. This, virtually inevitably, leads to a loss of all 
the  potential  profits  from  the  fishery  (Gordon,  1954; 
Hardin, 1968). As a result, although there are individual 
exceptions, the fisheries of the world are not generating 
much economic profits. If anything they are losing a good 
deal of money which is made good by subsidies (World 
Bank, 2008). The economic waste in global fisheries, i.e. 
the fisheries rents loss, has recently been estimated to be 
some US$50 billion per year ( 2006; World Bank, 2008). 
To put this amount in context, it is slightly less than the 
total amount of money given for development assistance 
in the world (Addison et al., 2005). 
The Nile perch fishery in Lake Victoria is one of the 
world’s more valuable commercial fisheries. It developed 
after Nile perch were introduced into the lake in the late 
1950s  and  early  1960s  and  has  been  producing  some 
300,000  t  annually  in  recent  years;  it  employs  tens  of 
thousands of people and is a major export industry for the 
three countries involved. Clearly the Nile perch is a very 
valuable  resource.  The  question  is  whether  the  current 
fisheries  management  and  harvesting  policies  are 
maximizing the long run net economic benefits from this 
fishery. 
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The fisheries problem
The  fisheries  problem is  fundamentally  caused  by 
the common property problem, i.e., the absence of private 
property rights in the fishery. It is this lack of individual 
rights to stocks and harvests which basically forces fishers 
to engage in a wasteful  competition with each other for 
shares in the obtainable catch. This waste appears as:
(1) excessive fishing fleets and effort; 
(2) excessively reduced fish stocks; 
(3) little  or  no  profitability  and  unnecessarily  low 
personal incomes;
(4) unnecessarily  low  contribution  of  the  fishing 
industry to the GDP; and
(5) a threat to the sustainability of the fishery.
The essence of the fisheries problem is captured 
by the diagram in Figure 1. In this diagram the revenue, 
biomass and cost curves of a typical fishery are drawn as 
functions of fishing effort. All three curves are sustainable 
in  the  sense  that  they  would  apply  in  the  long  run,  if 
fishing effort was kept constant at the corresponding level.
Figure 1. A graphic depiction of the sustainable fisheries 
model.  OSY  =  optimal  sustainable  yield,  CSY  = 
Competitive Sustainable Yield, which is equivalent to the 
open access equilibrium.
The lower part of Figure 1 describes what happens to 
sustainable  biomass  as  fishing  effort  is  increased. 
Basically sustainable biomass is monotonically reduced as 
fishing effort is increased (note that the level of biomass is 
measured in a downward direction) If, as illustrated in the 
diagram, fishing effort exceeds a certain level, the stock 
size becomes insufficient  for regeneration, the fishery is 
no longer  sustainable  at  that  effort  level,  and  the stock 
collapses.
The  upper  part  of  Figure  1  is  the  well  known 
sustainable  fisheries  model  initially  forwarded  by  Scott 
Gordon  (1954).  As  illustrated,  sustainable  revenues 
initially increase with fishing effort but at a declining rate 
as  the biomass  is  reduced.  At a certain  level  of fishing 
effort,  sustainable  revenues  are  maximized.  If  fishing 
effort is increased beyond this point, sustainable revenues 
decline  as  the  biomass  level  is  reduced  still  further. 
Finally, at a certain level of fishing effort, the fishery is no 
longer sustainable. The stock collapses and there will be 
no sustainable revenues. As drawn in Figure 1, costs, on 
the other hand, increase monotonically with fishing effort.
Figure 1 reveals that the socially optimal level of the 
fishery occurs at fishing effort level  e*. At this level of 
fishing effort, profits and consequently the contribution of 
the fisheries to GDP is maximized. It should be noted that 
that  the  optimal  fishing  effort  e*  is  less  than  the  one 
corresponding  to  the  maximum  sustainable  yield. 
Consequently,  the optimal sustainable stock level,  x*, is 
comparatively high as can be seen from the lower part of 
the  figure.  An  optimal  fisheries  policy  is  therefore 
biologically conservative and the risk of a serious stock 
decline is generally very low.
Under  the  common  property  arrangement  of  the 
fishery,  the  fishing  industry  will  find  equilibrium  at 
fishing effort level, ec. At this level of fishing effort, costs 
equal revenues and there are no net profits or rents in the 
fishing industry. If, at the same time fishing labour is paid 
its reservation wage the net contribution of the fishery to 
the GDP is approximately zero. In other words, the fishery 
contributes  virtually  no  net  benefits  to  the  economy. 
Notice  that  this  is  the  equilibrium  outcome  in  any 
common  property  fishery  irrespective  of  the  size  and 
productivity of the underlying natural resource. 
The reason  for  this  unfortunate  outcome is  not 
difficult to understand. Assume for instance that fishing 
effort is below the equilibrium level,  ec. At this level of 
fishing effort there will be profits. This does two things. It 
encourages existing fishers to expand their operations in 
order to increase their profits. It attracts new participants 
wanting to partake in these profits into the fishery.  Thus 
investment in fishing capital takes place and fishing effort 
rises. Obviously this process will continue as long as there 
are any profits to be had in the fishery. Equilibrium in the 
common property fishery will only be reached when there 
are no profits, i.e. at effort level ec. 
Compared  to  the net-benefits  obtainable by the 
optimal  fishery,  the  common  property  arrangement  is 
highly wasteful. Not only does it generate little or no net 
economic benefits, it also implies a much smaller biomass 
level. Indeed, as can easily be verified from inspection of 
Figure 1, the common property fishery may easily imply 
the exhaustion of the biomass altogether. 
It is important to realize that fishers subject to the 
common property arrangement  can  do nothing to  avoid 
this  wasteful  outcome.  When  many  fishers  share 
ownership in a  common fish stock, each one has  every 
reason to grasp as large a share of the potential yield as 
possible.  Prudent  harvesting  by  one  fisher  in  order  to 
maintain the stocks will, for the most part, only benefit the 
other  more  aggressive  fishers  without  preventing  the 
ultimate decline of the stocks. Thus, each fisher, acting in 
isolation, is powerless to alter the course of the fishery. 
His best strategy is to try to grasp as large a share in the 
fishery as possible while the biomass is still large enough 
to yield some profits. 
This, in a nutshell, is what Hardin (1968) called ‘the 
tragedy of commons’. The common property arrangement 
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in fisheries basically forces the fishers to overexploit the 
fish resources, even against their own better judgment. As 
a result, the potential benefits of these resources, no matter 
how  great,  become  wasted  under  the  onslaught  of  a 
multitude of users. 
Global fisheries rents loss
In 2006, the World Bank and the FAO organized a 
major  research  effort  to  assess  the  degree  of  economic 
inefficiency in ocean capture fisheries worldwide (World 
Bank, 2008).  A two-pronged approach was adopted. On 
the one hand, the world’s ocean fisheries were treated as 
one big fishery and the level of rents and rents loss in this 
fishery assessed. On the other hand, several case studies 
of individual fisheries around the world were undertaken 
with  specific  models  for  each  particular  fishery  being 
constructed and the level of rents and rents loss in each 
one of them assessed.
According  to  the  results  of  the  World  Bank/FAO 
study, the common property problem in fisheries has been 
even more devastating than previously thought. The study 
confirms what the FAO has been saying for years; that the 
great majority of the world’s commercial fish stocks are 
seriously  overexploited.  The  global  commercial  fish 
stocks are estimated to be less than a quarter of their initial 
(pre-exploitation) size and between 1/3 and 1/2 of what 
would be economically optimal. Similarly, global fishing 
fleets  and  fishing  effort  are  hugely  excessive.  Fishing 
fleets in operation (a large number of fishing vessels are 
lying idle around the world) are estimated to be two to 
three times larger than what would be needed for optimal 
fishing.  Perhaps  most  shockingly,  the  net  economic 
benefits from the global utilization of the world’s ocean 
fish stocks are very small. In fact, in terms of profits, it 
appears that the global fishery is actually operated at an 
overall loss of some US$ 5 billion annually, a loss made 
good by subsidies to fishing companies in the developed 
part  of  the  world.  This  real  operating  loss  should  be 
compared  to  the  attainable  net  profits  from a  well  run 
global marine fishery which according to the World Bank/
FAO report  is  about  US$ 46  billion  annually.  The  key 
results of the World Bank/FAO study are summarized in 
Table 1.
Table 1.  Rents and rents loss in the global fishery.  The calculations in this table are based on two different biomass 
growth functions,  the logistic (Clark,  1976) and that proposed by Fox (1970),  both of which are theoretically and 
empirically possible, giving two sets of outcomes. From World Bank (2008).
Current Optimal Difference 
Units Logistic Fox Logistic Fox Logistic Fox
Biomass t x 106 148.4 92.3 314.2 262.9 165.8 170.6
Harvest t x 106 85.7 85.7 80.8 81.6 -4.9 -4.1
Fleet/Effort Index 1.00 1.00 0.56 0.46 -0.44 -0.54
Profits USD x 109 -5.0 -5.0 39.5 54.0 44.5 59.0
Rents USD x 109 -5.0 -5. 39.5 54.0 44.5 59.0
The  World  Bank/FAO  aggregate  study  employed 
two different  biomass growth functions, the logistic one 
(Clark 1976) and the one proposed by the biologist Fox 
(1970),  neither  of which was preferred by the available 
empirical data nor basic theory. As a result there are two 
sets of results, one for the logistic and one for the Fox 
biomass growth function.
As indicated in Table 1, the global fishery could 
yield net economic benefits between US$ 39.5 billion and 
54.0 billion annually. In the base year, 2004, however, the 
global fishery was run at a loss (before subsidies) of US$ 
5 billion. Thus, the annual rents loss in the global fishery 
is between US$ 44.5 billion and 59 billion depending on 
which  biomass  growth  function  applies.  This  rents  loss 
amounts to about 60% of the total revenues of the global 
ocean fishery in the base year.
Of course  these  results  are  subject  to  considerable 
uncertainty which is extensively discussed in the report. 
This  uncertainty  stems  from  various  sources  but  most 
important  is  the  lack  of  precision  in  the  estimates  of 
parameters  of  the global  fisheries  model  underlying  the 
results.  The  uncertainty  of  the  rents  loss  estimate  is 
illustrated in Figure 2 and the corresponding confidence 
intervals are reported in Table 2.
Table  2.  Estimates  of  global  rents  loss  according  to 
confidence intervals (from World Bank, 2008).
Confidence
Estimated rents loss
(billion US$)
95% 26-73
90% 31-70
80% 37-67
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Figure 2. Uncertainty of the global rents loss estimate: density and distribution functions (from World Bank, 2008)
The results from the aggregate global ocean fishery 
were supported by the individual case studies. About 20 
such studies of different fisheries were carried out and a 
considerable range in the rents loss in individual fisheries 
was observed but, taken together, the results were similar 
to the ones from the aggregate global study.
The  inescapable  conclusion  is  that,  far  from 
benefiting  the  people  of  the  world,  the  global  ocean 
fishery is actually an economic burden. Having decimated 
most  of  the  fish  stocks  by  excessive  harvesting,  the 
world’s  global  fishing  fleets  are  contributing  next  to 
nothing the world’s economy and a significant part of the 
fishing fleets are being kept afloat by subsidies in various 
forms.
The  global  marine  fishery  provides  a  striking 
example of how much economic damage can be caused by 
the  common  property  problem.  The  common  property 
problem not only affects the global fishery but operates in 
any  fishery  which  doesn’t  have  enforceable  property 
rights. Neither is it restricted to ocean fisheries, or even 
large scale fisheries, because small scale inland fisheries 
fall just as easily prey to the common property problem as 
large scale ocean ones.  
Rents loss in the Lake Victoria Nile perch fishery 
Nile perch were introduced into Lake Victoria in the 
early 1950’s. By 1980, the Nile perch fishery had attained 
major  commercial  significance.  Helped  by  successful 
international marketing campaigns,  foreign and domestic 
investors  installed  fish  processing  plants  specializing in 
Nile perch products. As a result, demand for Nile perch 
landings  expanded  greatly  attracting  a  dramatically 
increased number of fishers to the fishery.  In  2006, the 
Nile  perch  fishery  contributed  over  24  %  of  the  total 
volume  of  fish  harvest  and  66  % of  income generated 
from  fisheries  in  the  three  East  African  countries  of 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania (LVFO, 2007).
In terms of commercial value the Nile perch fishery 
dominates  the  Lake  Victoria  basin  fisheries;  in  Kenya 
alone, which has a 6% share of the lake’s area, the income 
derived from Nile perch fishery in 2006 was estimated to 
be  US$134  million  (landed  value).  Nile  perch  fish 
products  processed  by  fish  processing  plants  based  in 
Kenya earned a further US $43.0 million in international 
trade. Thus, it may be estimated that the Nile perch fishery 
generated  income of  over  US$ 177.0  million  in  Kenya 
alone.
Unfortunately,  there  are  strong indications  that  the 
Nile  perch  catches  have  for  some  time  exceeded  the 
biological  productivity  of  the  resource.  As a  result,  the 
stock  is  now  severely  overexploited  and  incapable  of 
sustaining catch level unless a stock rebuilding program is 
initiated. At the same time, the number of fishers in Lake 
Victoria has continued to increase, further increasing the 
pressure on Nile perch and other fish species in the lake. 
The data are not readily available but it seems inevitable 
that  this  decline  will  be  accompanied  by  substantially 
diminished  profits  to  the  fish  processors  and  severely 
reduced  incomes  to  individual  fishers  and  their 
households.
Thus it  seems that  the Nile perch fishery has now 
fallen victim to the same common property problem that 
has devastated so many fisheries around the world. This 
outcome is no surprise. The fact that this fishery has, by 
and  large,  been  operated  as  a  common  pool  fishery 
without an appropriate rights-based fisheries management 
regime made this outcome virtually inevitable. The longer 
the  current  inefficient  fisheries  management  regime 
persists,  the  greater  will  be  the  devastation  of  the  Nile 
perch  and  other  fish  stocks  in  the  lake  and  the  more 
difficult  it  will  be  to  return  to  a  healthy  sustainable 
fishery.
During the winter of 2006/7, Mr. Simon Warui of the 
Ministry  of  Livestock  and  Fisheries  Development  in 
Kenya investigated of the Lake Victoria Nile perch fishery 
as a part of his studies at the United Nations University 
Fisheries Training Programme in Iceland (Warui, 2007). 
This study, of course, is not the final word on the matter. 
It  was and remains a student dissertation based on three 
months  of  research  work.  Nevertheless,  at  this  point  of 
time, it is the most complete study of the rents and rents 
loss in this fishery. Moreover, it tells a story that fits both 
with theory and the experience from a multitude of similar 
common property fisheries around the world.
In  his  work,  Warui  adopted  the  World Bank/FAO 
methodology (World Bank, 2008) His model of the Nile 
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perch  fishery may be summarized in  three  equations  as 
follows:
(1) ( )x G x y= −&          (Biomass growth function)
(2) ( , )y Y e x=                      (Harvesting function)
(3) ( , ) ( )p Y e x C epi = ⋅ −            (Profit function)
The five variables of this model, i.e. x, y, e, pi and p 
represent  biomass,  harvest,  fishing  effort,  profits  and 
landings  price,  respectively.  The  first  four  are 
endogenous, i.e.  determined within the fishery, while the 
fifth  (price)  is  exogenous,  i.e.  determined  by  market 
conditions outside the fishery. The derivative, x x t≡ ∂ ∂&  
measures the change in biomass at a point of time.
The  model  comprises  three  elementary  functions 
basic to any bio-economic fisheries model; (i) the natural 
growth function,  G(x), (ii) the harvesting function Y(e,x), 
and  (iii)  the  cost  function,  C(e).  The  form adopted  for 
these functions is specified below. As in the World Bank/
FAO global study there are two options for the biomass 
growth function. 
(4)
2 (logistic)
( )
(Fox)( )
x x
G x
a x b ln x x
α β ⋅ − ⋅
= 
⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ .
The harvesting function is specified as:
(5) ( , ) dY e x q e x= ⋅ ⋅ ,
This is an extended version of the Schaefer (1954) 
harvesting function with  q as the catchability coefficient 
and d as the schooling parameter. Normally [0,1]d ∈ . A 
value of d close to one would indicate little schooling and 
a lower d suggests increasing tendency toward schooling. 
For species such as Nile perch, b is thought to be between 
0.75 and 0.95.
Finally, the cost function is specified as 
(6) ( )C e c e fk= ⋅ + ,
where c is a parameter and fk represents fixed costs.
The  parameters  of  the  model  represented  by 
equations (4)-(6) were estimated partly on the basis of the 
available data and partly by using the data-poor estimation 
techniques  explained  in  the  World  Bank/FAO  (2008) 
study. The key data used in the estimation are summarized 
in Table 3.
On  the  basis  of  the  fisheries  model  expressed  by 
equations (4)-(6) and the estimates of its parameters it is 
possible  to  derive  a  the  traditional  sustainable  fisheries 
model  for  the  Nile  perch  fishery  corresponding  to  the 
upper panel of Figure 1.
The results of the rents and rents loss drain according 
to both the logistic and Fox biomass growth functions are 
summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3.  Key data used in the estimation of the Nile perch 
fisheries model
Variable Assumed value
Maximum sustainable yield (t x 103) 300.0
Virgin stock biomass (t x 103) 1427.0
Landings in base year 2006 (t x 103) 255.0
Landings price in base year 2006 (US$ kg-1) 1.50
Net biomass growth in base year 2006 
(t x 103) 0.00
Profits in base year 2006 (US$ x 106) 53.0
As illustrated in Figure 3, the model, employing the 
logistic biomass growth function, indicates that the current 
fishing effort  (measured in non-motorized boat  units)  is 
well  above  the  one  corresponding  to  the  maximum 
sustainable yield and way beyond the optimal level. As a 
result, the sustainable yield with the current effort is only 
about  250,000  t  compared  to  the  assumed  maximum 
sustainable yield of 300,000 t. Even more worrying is that 
effort  is  currently  just  below  that  where  the  biomass 
ceases to be sustainable, i.e. where the sustainable revenue 
curve  becomes  vertical.  The  fishery  appears  to  be  in 
serious danger of a collapse if the present level of fishing 
effort is maintained.
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Figure  3.  A  sustainable  fisheries  model  for  Nile  perch 
derived  from  the  logistic  biomass  growth  model. = 
yield,  = costs, e* = optimal level of fishing effort, ep = 
present level of fishing effort.
According  to  Figure  3  the  fishery  in  2006  was 
operated  at  slight  profits,  some  US$50  million.  This 
should be compared to the potential profits of more than 
US$200 million which could be attained on a sustainable 
basis if a more appropriate fisheries policy was adopted. 
This  more  appropriate  fisheries  policy  reduces  fishing 
effort by some 40 and would be attained at a biomass level 
about double the current one and sustainable harvests of 
some 280,000 t annually. The results of the rents and rents 
loss drain according to both the logistic and Fox biomass 
growth functions are summarized in Table 4.
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Table 4.  A summary of the main results, using the logistic and Fox model to compare the current situation in the Nile 
perch fishery with predicted optimal values. 
 Current Optimal Difference
 Logistic Fox Logistic Fox Logistic Fox
Biomass (t x 103) 436.3 264.3 892.9 717.0 456.6 452.7
Harvest (t x 103) 254.7 254.7 281.1 282.1 26.4 27.4
Effort (boats x 103) 94.7 94.7 56.9 44.9 -37.8 -49.8
Profits (US$ x 106) 52.9 52.9 216.4 257.0 163.5 204.1
Rents (US$ x 106) 72.0 72.0 235.5 276.1 163.5 204.1
Notable information in Table 4, in addition to what 
has  already been discussed,  is  that  it  doesn´t  make any 
material  difference  to  the  optimal  policy  whether  the 
logistic biomass growth function or the Fox one applies. 
In  both cases  fishing effort  should be reduced  by some 
40-50%.  However,  if  the  Fox  biomass  growth  function 
applies, the actual rents loss of the current policy and the 
maximum attainable rents are substantially (some US$ 40 
million)  greater  than  if  the  logistic  biomass  growth 
function  applies.  The  reason  is  that  the  Fox  biomass 
growth function is more resilient (generates more biomass 
growth)  at  low  stock  sizes  than  the  logistic.  So,  if  it 
actually  applies  the  calculated  base  year  Nile  perch 
biomass level in Lake Victoria is substantially less and the 
gains  from  a  stock  rebuilding  policy  correspondingly 
greater than if the Fox biomass growth function applies.
As in any study of this kind, there is  a substantial 
uncertainty  regarding  the  model  and  its  parameters. 
Stochastic  analysis  based  on  Monte  Carlo  simulations 
indicates  that  with  90%  confidence  the  current  fishing 
effort should be reduced by some 25-60% to achieve the 
optimal sustainable yield. With the same 90% probability 
this would yield net  economic gains  of between US$90 
million and 260 million annually.
It  is  one  thing  to  identify  the  optimal  sustainable 
yield  and quite  another  to  describe the best  way to get 
there. Simple dynamic analysis suggests that to maximize 
the  present  value  of  the  net  profits  from the  fishery  it 
would be necessary to close it immediately for one year, 
followed by a small  amount of fishing in the following 
year  and  increase  fishing  effort  in  the  third  and  fourth 
years until it reaches its long-term sustainable level. This 
would be characterized by a fishing effort of roughly 2/3 
of the current level and a catch of around 280,000 t per 
year.
This  optimal path of  fishing effort  is  illustrated in 
Figure 4. The first year in the diagram represents the base 
year  fishing  effort;  subsequent  years  represent  the 
approximately  optimal  dynamic  policy.  The  stock 
rebuilding policy depicted in Figure 4 is qualitatively the 
same  as  predicted  by  optimal  dynamic  theory  and  the 
actual  ones that have been much more carefully worked 
out for other overexploited fisheries.  One can therefore be 
reasonably confident in the broad structure of this policy. 
The  rent  maximizing  dynamic  policy  involves 
somewhat  dramatic  reduction  in  fishing  effort  and 
harvests  at  the outset.  This  may be  socially  difficult  to 
endure.  Therefore,  a  more  moderate  stock  rebuilding 
policy may be more appropriate. This will lead to a longer 
adjustment  period  until  the  optimal  sustainable 
equilibrium is attained. Given the current depressed state 
of  the  Nile  perch  stock,  any  sensible  policy  would 
nevertheless imply a substantial reduction in fishing effort 
right away.
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Figure 4.  The evolution of fishing effort  following the 
establishment  of  an  optimum fishing  effort  policy.  The 
first year in the diagram represents the base year fishing 
effort;  subsequent  years  represent  the  approximately 
optimal dynamic policy.
There  are  some  indications  that  the  natural 
productivity of the Lake Victoria basin may be declining, 
possibly reflecting the impact  of pollution or  long term 
environmental cycles (Awange and Ong’an’ga, 2007). If 
this is the case, the total benefits of the stock rebuilding 
policies  outlined  above  might  be  too  optimistic.  It  is 
important  to realize,  however,  that even in this case the 
gains from these policies would still outweigh the losses 
that  will  occur  if  the  current  policies  are  allowed  to 
continue.  Moreover,  the best  fishing effort  policy in an 
environment where productivity is declining would still be 
roughly  the  same.  It  would  still  be  optimal  to  reduce 
fishing effort drastically. 
Discussion
Common  property  fisheries  virtually  without 
exception lead to overexploitation and loss of economic 
fisheries rents. In the global fishery, the resulting loss in 
economic rents is huge (World Bank 2008). It is by now 
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well established (see e.g. Shotton, 2000; Arnason, 2007) 
that  the  best  way  to  overcome  the  common  property 
problem s problem is  introduce  a fisheries  management 
regime based on property rights.  For  this purpose ITQs 
(individual  transferable  quotas),  TURFs  (territorial  user 
rights) and community fishing rights have been introduced 
in many fisheries around the world (Shotton, 2000). The 
first two systems have clearly demonstrated their ability 
for recovering economic rents in fisheries and, in addition, 
introducing various kinds of new efficiencies in fisheries. 
The performance of ITQs, which are applicable to a much 
wider  range  of  fisheries  than  TURFS,  has  been 
particularly  impressive.  Encouraged  by  the  observed 
benefits of ITQs in other nations, over 15 major fishing 
nations  have  now  adopted  the  ITQ-system  in  their 
fisheries management regimes and well over 20% of the 
global  ocean fish catch is now taken under this form of 
fisheries  management.  In  all  these  cases,  increases  in 
economic efficiency and profitability have been dramatic. 
In most cases previously declining fish stocks stabilized 
and in some cases recovered (Costello et al., 2008).
The Lake Victoria Nile perch fisheries management 
regime has essentially been a common property fishery. 
This is the fundamental cause of the inexorable decline in 
the biological foundation and the economic return of this 
fishery.  To  halt  this  trend  and  embark  on  a  socially 
responsible fisheries policy as outlined in section 4 above, 
it is necessary to develop and implement a new fisheries 
management  regime.  Theory  and  experience  of  other 
fishing nations shows that this management regime has to 
be based on high quality property rights. Apart from this, 
not much can be asserted without a careful  study of the 
social situation.
An ITQ-system seems attractive but may be difficult 
to enforce on an individual fisher basis. Organizing fishers 
into communities holding community ITQs and with some 
TURF rights may be a practical as well as an efficient way 
to  go.  The  ITQs  would  be  enforced  on  the  community 
level  and,  provided  that  enforcement  is  effectively 
conducted, the communities would be induced to control 
their own members. This system of community ITQs has 
been  tried  for  instance  in  England  and  Holland  with 
encouraging results (MRAG et al., 2008). It goes without 
saying that under this system, each of the nations involved 
would have their own national Nile perch quota for which 
they are responsible and could allocate to their community 
units. These national quotas could be transferable and any 
overages  by individual  nations  would  be subject  to  the 
appropriate  payment  to  the  other  nations  plus  the 
appropriate  penalty.  It  is  clear  that  for  these  national 
constraints  to  hold,  each  of  the  nations  would  have  to 
exhibit a high degree of national responsibility. 
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